Loyola University Chicago

Loyola eCommons
Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other
Works

Faculty Publications and Other Works by
Department

1985

Hegel on Leibniz and Individuation
David Ingram
Loyola University Chicago, dingram@luc.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/philosophy_facpubs
Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Ingram, David. Hegel on Leibniz and Individuation. Kant-Studien, 76, 1-4: , 1985. Retrieved from Loyola
eCommons, Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works, http://dx.doi.org/10.1515/
kant.1985.76.1-4.420

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Publications and Other Works by Department
at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Philosophy: Faculty Publications and Other Works by an
authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
© 1985 De Gruyter

~
Hegel on Leibniz and Individuation 1
by David Ingram, Cedar Falls/Iowa
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The cardinal principle of Hegel's metaphysics is that reason constitutes the essence of
reality. Taken in conjunction with Hegel's notorious endorsement of Leibniz's identity
of indiscernibles doctrine (P. 1), the principle would seem to imply that we must turn to
the internal conceptual determinations of a thing if we are to find the sufficient reason
for its being the particular thing that it is. 2 Now if one were to combine the doctrine
with the principles of sufficient reason (P. 2) and contradiction (P. 3) in the way that
Leibniz does·, then what is proper to a thing's identity would be just those properties
that are truly predicated of it, or more precisely, contained in its complete notion as
ascertained by conceptual analysis (either terminating or non-terminating depending on
the apperceptive capacity of the intellect in question). The complete notion of a
substance (or monad), consisting as it does for Leibniz in the totality of its relations to
other susbtances, is internally connected to the aggregate of individuals maintained in
perfect harmony by God in accordance with the eternal essences and the principles of
logic. Such a view of identity is not unproblematic for Hegel; the theory of internal
relations agrees with his own critique of "bare particulars" and he finds Leibniz's
notion of substance atttractive, especially inasmuch as the monad is conceived as a selfdetermining entelechy which reflects the Absolute.' But Hegel's assessment of the
extent to which the monad exhibits a spiritual propinquity is hardly univocal. He
observes elsewhere that the monad is but an external, passive reflection of the world and
he likens its flow of perceptions to the mechanical necessity of steam rising from a
coffee cup or of bubbles rising through water - this despite the fact that Leibniz himself
advanced a teleological ground of sufficient reason to supplement explanations based
upon efficient causality.' Symptomatic of the above defect are Leibniz's tendency to
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helpful criticism of earlier drafts of this paper.
G. W. F. Hegel, Vorlesungen uber die Geschichte der Philosophie, in: Samtliche Werke, Band 19,
ed. Hermann Glockner, Stuttgart, 1927, pp. 458 & 473. English translation by E. S. Haldane
and F. H. Simpson, Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philosophy, Vol. III, Humanities Press,
London, 1972, pp. 334-35 & 348.
G. W. F. Hegel, Wissenschaft der Logik, Vol.I, in: Samtliche Werke, Band 4, pp. 675-76.
English translation by A. V. Miller, Hegel's Science of Logic, Humanities Press, London, 1969,

pp. 539-40.
Logik I, pp. 489, 554-55 & Logik II (Band 5), p. 270; Logic, pp. 396, 446, & 781.
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overcompensate for the atomistic nature of his system by reducing accidents to essences
and his inability to account for phenomenal contingency and mutability. 5
The preceding difficulties bear upon the problem of individuation accordingly: if one
reduces all accidental properties to essential ones - an implication which follows from
the principle of sufficient reason, or the principle which asserts that the predicate of any
true proposition is analytically contained in the concept of the subject - then the
deprivation of a single property from a thing, no matter how insignificant that property
may appear to be, entails that the thing in question necessarily no longer is what it was.
Moreover, the inclusion of relational predicates among the pool of properties entails a
reductive monism. Thus, we find in Leibniz's metaphysics the typical post-Cartesian
duplication of the classical essence/accident conundrum in the dualism of essence and
appearance; the essences of things as they exist in the divine intellect sub specie
aeternitatis are unchanging and logically indiscernible, but when manifested as
phenomena such things have properties which are continually changing under conditions of mutual opposition.
The thesis I wish to defend, which runs counter to the interpretation advanced by
Bradley and others, is that Hegel is neither a reductive monist in the way that Spinoza is
nor a sometime monist, sometime pluralist in the way that Leibniz is. Hegel is certainly
closer to Leibniz on this score, for he is a strong defender of the metaphysical reality of
individuals, contingency, freedom, and change; yet like a good rationalist, he no less
than Leibniz aspires to conviction founded upon sufficient reason. Unlike that of
his predecessor whom he accuses of inconsistency, Hegel's metaphysics subordinates
analytic rationality and its concern with non-contradiction to a higher principle of
reason. This reassessment was in large part inspired by what many feel to be a
tendentious reading of Kant's discussion of the dialectical nature of pure reason.' But
Hegel's reading, however idiosyncratic it may be, owes more to Kant's pioneering
discovery of transcendental apperception conceived as synthesis-activity which posits
its own self-identity while constituting its object. Hegel dubs this activity determinate
reflexion, or thought which establishes its self-identity as an immanently contradictory
relation between a posited other and itself. Now in Book II of his Logik, Hegel
attempts to overcome the classical and contemporary dichotomies mentioned above
and to explain how identity is compatible with phenomenal change. His argument
purports to show both that the sufficient reason for a thing's identity resides in its
immanent, conceptual determinations, which are grounded in unitary determine reflection (his defense of P. 1 and a dialectical version of P. 2), and that any given thing's
particular identity is nonetheless indeterminate, i.e., groundless (contingent) and
mutable - 'other' with respect to the totality of beings and with respect to itself.

5

Logik I, pp. 476-78; Logic, pp. 383-85.
' See Martial Gueroult, Hegel's Urteil uber die Antithetik der reinen Vernunft, in: Seminar:
Dialektik in der Philosophie Hegels, ed. R. P. Horstmann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1978,
pp. 261-82.
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My argument shall proceed as follows: First I shall argue that the problem of
individuation raised in Book I of the Logik is only resolved in Book II, where Hegel
examines the categories of reflection. I shall then discuss the importance of Kant's
earlier treatment of the amphibolies of reflection for an understanding of Hegel's
disagreement with Leibniz over the problem of identity. Finally, I shall endeavor to
show how the problem of identity gets resolved in the manner I have hitherto indicated
by briefly adumbrating the key arguments in Book II.

relation to an indefinite multiplicity of other things, thereby generating an innumerable
set of relational properties which may be truly ascribed to it and (3) P. 1: each thing is
complete and sufficient unto itself. 10 Taken together, these propositions produce two
related antinomies. The first concerns the contradiction between the absolute selfsubsistence of things and their relational dependence upon one another. 11 The second
stems from the internalization of the above contradiction within the individual thing so
that the identity, or essential unity, of a thing is opposed to its indefinite mutability. 12 In
order to understand the dialectical relationship between these two antinomies it is
imperative that we briefly survey the relevant passages in Book I of the Logik.
The portion of the text which primarily concerns us is contained in the chapter
entitled, "Das Dasein", where Hegel presents his initial demonstration of the plausibility of the aforementioned antinomies. Despite the etymological connection between
Dasein and spatial location, Hegel seeks to vindicate the Spinozistic dictum, omnis
determinatio est negatio, or the claim that qualities (Bestimmtheiten) individuate by
limiting, or negating being. The metaphysical topos of the Logik is not constrained by
conditions of sensibility and so, ex hypothesi, Hegel is perforce a defender of P. 1. If
Hegel has a retort to Kant's well known caveat against P. 1, it can only be a variation of
Leibniz's view that difference solo numero as ascertained by comparative observation is
indifferent to individuation. 13 Hegel's version of this argument runs as follows: The
basis for saying, for example, that the leaves of a book are one unitary entity as opposed
to a multitude of unrelated bits of paper is not that, in the former case, the sheets of
paper are somewhat more contiguous than in the latter (the leaves of my book can be
scattered throughout my house and still be parts of the same thing). Abstract units do
not eo ipso reveal any unifying principle at all. 1'
Now it can be objected that this argument does not adequately refute Kantian
reservations with respect to P. 1. P. F. Strawson has developed a powerful argument
along Kantian lines that acknowledges the validity of Hegel's point, 15 namely that
spatial continuity is insufficient to establish the formal identity of discrete totalities,
without abandoning Kant's major contention that two co-existing, formally welldefined things, such as two virtually indiscernible drops of water, are sufficiently
differentiated relative to the abstract, partes extra partes continuum of space and time.
Hegel, however, could respond with some justification that the position defended by
Kant and Strawson pertains, by their own admission, to the transcendental problem
concerning the possibility of identifying objects within the peculiar ambit of human
sensory experience and does not address the logical question with which he and Leibniz
are concerned, i.e., whether complete descriptions containing nothing but general
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Hegel's critique of Leibniz's theory of individuation is closely interwoven with some
of the opening arguments in Book I of the Logik and therefore we would be well
advised to get clear about the overall structure of this work before proceeding further.
The Logik is a transcendental deduction of categories arranged in ascending order in
which those that are the most abstract and least penetrating are shown to presuppose
those that are progressively richer and deeper in meaning. The nisus toward greater
concreteness and semantic coherence corresponds to the realization of categorical
rationality, conceived as the comprehensive grounding and reconciliation of opposed
moments of reality. Because ordinary thought is regarded by Hegel as possessing the
least developed and most superficial conception of reality, the Logik will initially be
concerned with describing and critically reconstructing its categories.' Significantly, the
vollstandig entwickelte Widerspruch which Hegel detects in Leibniz's theory of individuation is also identified by him as the theoretical expression of those antinomies
which pervade der gesunde M enschenverstand. 8 These contradictions are not mere
logical faux pas, but have ontological validity. We ought not to spare things the agony
of transient existence out of some misguided Zartlichkeit for them by blaming the
fallacious use of reason for all antinomies in the way that Kant did.'
The contradictions implicit in Leibniz's monad revolve around the following three
commonsense beliefs: (1) P. 2: the predicate of any true proposition is contained in the
subject (where subject and predicate terms are taken to refer to the actual thing and its
properties respectively), (2) the Principle of Continuity (P.4): each thing stands in

7

).

9

As Terry Pinkard has observed (The Logic of Hegel's Logic, in: Journal of the History of
Philosophy, Vol. XVIII, No. 4, 1980, p. 420) Hegel's Logik does not fit either the descriptive or.
revisionary models of metaphysics which Strawson talks about in his study, Individuals. In the.
Introduction to the System der Philosophie Hegel says that the Logik is a descriptive ontology of
timeless categories which display varying degrees of truth. Though all categories (and philosophies) express a universally valid content, they differ with respect to the formal rationality in
terms of which they articulate it.
Vorlesungen, p. 454; Lectures, Vol. III, p. 330. Here Hegel explicitly accuses Leibniz of deriving:;
his ideas from allgemeine Vorstellung.
,
G. W. F. Hegel, System der Philosophie, in: Sdmtliche Werke, Band 8, p. 140. English translationJ
by W. Wallace, The Logic of Hegel, Oxford, 1971, p. 98 ff.
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'it,'.

10
11
12

13

1
'
15

System, p. 403; The Logic of Hegel, p. 334.
Logik I, p. 199; Logic, pp. 169-70.
Logik I, pp. 676-77; Logic, p. 540.
Logik I, p. 458; Logic, pp. 334-35. On the necessity of a framework of individuation, see
Strawson, Individuals Garden City, N. Y., 1963, p. 12.
Logik I, p. 611; Logic, p. 490.
P. F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 23.
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terms referring to intrinsic properties (including non-spatial and non-temporal relations) are sufficient to differentiate individuals. 16 Despite Strawson's hypothetical
thought experiments concerning auditory worlds, the logical question at the center of
Hegel's and Leibniz's concerns is given but perfunctory treatment by him and then
only insofar as it figures within Leibniz's metaphysics. Strawson admirably exposes the
metaphysical obstacles preventing Leibniz from making good his inclusion of P. 1 as a
logical principle in his system without having recourse to extra-logical, theological
assumptions." I shall argue below that these obstacles, which principally revolve
around Leibniz's linking of P. 2 to P. 3, are circumvented by Hegel. Of course, one
might still be tempted, again following Strawson, to delimit the range of conceivable
objectivity to spatio-temporal existence, thereby excluding such entities as 'private'
particulars and 'theoretical constructs' from membership. 18 The decision to exclude
imperceptible entities, concrete universals, and monads from membership in the class
of conceivable objects, however, is not without need of further justification - a fact
which once again recalls standard misgivings with respect to the implicit circularity of
transcendental arguments. 1'
The aforementioned issues are too complicated and controversial to be pursued here.
However, I shall assume that it is at least an open question whether Kant or Strawson
has succeeded in disposing of P. 1. Returning to Hegel's opening argument in Book I,
we immediately confront a new problem, namely, that the discussion here appears to be
patterned after that contained in the Phanomenologie, 20 which is not a logical analysis at
all, but is rather a quasi-descriptive account of primitive experiences of referring - a
strategy which has misled some commentators into believing that Hegel, like Strawson

Strawson himself admits that the possibility of differentiating discrete spaces may depend on the
possibility of differentiating objects and vice-versa. Ibid., p. 26.
17
Strawson observes that if monads are only differentiated by their point of view, then one must
introduce something like Leibniz's principle of plenitude with all of its attendant theological
assumptions in order to guarantee nonduplication of perception. If, on the contrary, monads
are regarded sub specie aeternitatis as complete notions, or sets of concepts, then all such notions
would be analytically contained within the richest of all notions, namely that of the existing
world. Not only does this harmonious conceptual schema follow from the postulate of a God
who chooses the 'best possible world', i.e., one which ostensibly maximizes the greatest
diversity of phenomena compatible with the greatest simplicity (and vice-versa), but it has the
unintended result of reducing the claim 'is an actual individual' to 'is a member of the richest set
of concepts.' Ibid., pp. 124-131.
1
' Ibid., pp. 31-35.
19
See, R. Rorty, Strawson 's Objectivity Argument, Review of Metaphysics 24 (1970), p. 218.
20
G.W.F. Hegel, Phanomenologie des Geistes, Verlag Ullstein, Frankfurt, 1973, pp.65-73.
English translation by A. V. Miller, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, Oxford, 1979, pp. 58--66.
See C. Taylor, The Opening Arguments of the Phenomenology, in: Hegel: A Collection of
Critical Essays, ed. A. MacIntyre, Garden City, N. Y., 1972, pp. 151-187, for an account which
compares Hegel's critique of sinnliche Gewiflheit with Wittgenstein's refutation of ostensive
definition in the Philosophical Investigations.
16
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and Kant, is concerned with the limited transcendental problematic. 21 I shall not detain
myself here by giving a detailed exposition of Hegel's argument except to note that it
conforms to Strawson's own position, which holds that identification presupposes a
framework - whether it be spatio-temporal or conceptual - against which individuals
are situated. 22
Briefly, Hegel argues that each thing (Etwas) is differentiated via negative reference

j

to all others things (Anderes). Now something (A) is both 'not-other', i.e., it is just this

1

thing and no other, and 'other', since the 'other' (B) in terms of which A is
differentiated as this, is likewise a particular this which is, as such, only if A is 'other' to
it. This immanent 'contradiction' can be rephrased in the following manner. The
'distinctiveness' which sets something apart as this self-subsistent, self-identical individual (Ansichsein), contains implicit reference to its other (Sein-fiir-Anderes), but this
reference outside of itself, or dependence upon otherness, is just as much a negation of
its Ansichsein. Ordinary understanding tries to circumvent this contradiction by
positing a distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties. The result of Hegel's
abstruse argument is that intrinsic properties (Bestimmungen), which comprise the
simple identity that remains unscathed by entanglements with other things, implicate
extrinsic properties (Beschaffenheiten), and vice-versa. 23 Whether Hegel has in fact
demonstrated such a reciprocity is doubtful and this has led some commentators to
believe that he is guilty of committing a facile petitio principii. 24 The primary difficulty,
however, stems from Hegel's desire to effect a dialectical transition, the foundation of
which is laid in a more advanced stage of the Logik. Hegel's treatment of categorical
distinctions underlying a multi-level conception of reality weighs heavily on his present
attempt to forge an interdependence that clearly testifies to a reflective correspondence
(between inner and outer, essence and accident, form and matter, necessity and
contingency, etc.) while yet denoting the kind of asymmetrical distinctions which, at
the level of one-dimensional being, frustrate such a correlation. Nevertheless, it is
Hegel's contention that an object-level understanding of phenomenal qualities presupposes some kind of reflective, meta-understanding of unity. Essence, identified as
substrate, ground, sufficient reason, etc., must be invoked in order to offset the

21

See H.F. Fulda, Unzulangliche Bemerkungen zur Dialektik, in: Seminar: Dialektik in der
Philosophie Hegels, ed. R. P. Horstmann, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1978. Fulda considers the
dialectic of the Logik as pre-eminently one of progressive meaning modification whereby
abstract philosophical categories, which lack an ordinary linguistic referential context, have
their vagueness reduced through a rational reconstruction of such terms. Fulda maintains that
some basic transitions cannot be interpreted as attempts to eliminate semantic ambiguity.
Werden, e.g., is not part of the meaning of Sein, but rather denotes a necessary condition for
specifying a range of successful, non-antinomial application.
22
Hegel argues that primitive referring expressions such as 'something' and 'other' depend for
their efficacy on descriptive predicates which denote properties, a position which is also shared
by Strawson and Wittgenstein (seen. 20 above).
" Logik I, pp. 141-42; Logic, pp.124-25.
24
See P. Guyer, Hegel, Leibniz, und der Widerspruch im Endlichen, in: Seminar, pp. 254 ff.
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perpetual variability of surface phenomena and to explain the persistence of identity
amidst radical qualitative change without, as in the case of Leibniz, demoting the
phenomenal world to the status of mere illusion." Conversely, Hegel must show how
essence appears without disintegrating into discrete qualia.
If, as Charles Taylor has observed, the dialectic of being cannot be expounded
without recurring to the dialectic of essence, then the contradictions encountered at the
object-level between self- subsistence and internal relatedness to otherness on the one
hand and essential unity and phenomenal change on the other can only be understood
26
in terms of Hegel's discussion of identity in Book II. Significantly, attempts to
articulate Hegel's retrieval of Leibniz solely within the parameters of Book I have
misled some commentators to identify Hegel's ontology with Spinozistic monism."
Apropos of the above, we note, finally, that the denouement of "Das Dasein"
already anticipates a reflective understanding of the problem of identity. The category
that expresses the unity of Ansichsein and Sein-fur-Anderes is limit (Grenze) which,
according to Hegel, is the "middle between (the something and the other) wherein they
cease." 28 It is in a thing's limit that it has already passed over the evanescent boundary
separating itself from the other that 'bounds' it. Stated in non-spatial, semiological
terms, every identifying description contains general terms whose meanings are bounded or defined in reference to other meanings. If we view language as the general frame
of semantic reference, then it is plausible to imagine the totality of linguistic meaningfulness as implicitly implicated in every description. The reference to otherness would
then extend ad infinitum." But a new contradiction now surfaces which plays upon the
reciprocity (Wechselbestimmung) of finite and infinite. The progress to infinity has as
its ideal limit the complete self-contained totality (true infinity) which gathers the series
of references together and provides fixity of identification. This quest is never finished
due to the irrepressible re-emergence of limitation (the reciprocal definition of the
whole vis-a-vis its innumerable parts), which, lapsing indefinitely into otherness, or
dispersion, continually rescinds any closure (bad infinity) - hence Hegel's reference to

•··
~
a.

-----

Logik II, pp. 38-39; Logic, p. 602.
C. Taylor, Hegel, Cambridge, 1975, p. 384 n.
Guyer, in Hegel, Leibniz, und der Widerspruch im Endlichen, takes Hegel to be criticizing
ontological individualism by exposing its inner contradiction - a critique which putatively
establishes the thesis that ,, ... es schlielllich nur einen Begriff gegeben wird, und somit fur einen
Idealisten wie Hegel, auch nur einen Gegenstand" (232). Contrary to Guyer's reading of Hegel,
I wish to contend, along with J. N. Findlay (Hegel: A Re-examination, London 1958, p. 203)
that Hegel's idealism, though undermining a naive belief in the absolute Selbstandigkeit of
individual phenomena, seeks to avoid the undialectical conceptual reductionism of Spinoza and

Leibniz.
Logik I, pp.147-48; Logic, p.129.
Logik I, pp. 150-81, 676; Logic, pp. 131-54, 540.
Logik, p.675; Logic, p.539.
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II
Kant's animadversions regarding Leibniz's metaphysics are of primary concern to us
because they indicate a central weakness in the Leibnizian doctrine of individuation
which Hegel is anxious to avoid, namely, the reduction of real identity to abstract
logical identity. Furthermore, as Yvon Belaval has admirably demonstrated, Kant's
discussion of the concepts of reflection, which influenced the structural design of Book
II of the Logik, is pivotal for grasping the filiation of Hegel's metaphysics with Kant's
Copernican revolution in epistemology." Briefly, Leibniz's apperceptio, like Descartes'
cogito, is a species of external reflection. In the former case, a multiplicity of distinct
ideas is immediately given to apperception. In the case of the cogito it is the absolute
identity of the self. What is common to both modes of reflection is that they analyze
ideas, the very distinctness and objectivity of which are given independently of
reflection. In contrast, the peculiar mode of self-consciousness characteristics of Kant's
!ch denke is self-determining activity which synthetically constitutes its object.
Kant, Hegel avers, did not fully succeed in extricating the !ch denke from external
reflection, as is evidenced by his ontological distinction between sensibility and
understanding. However, he notes that prior to his rehabilitation of teleology in the
Kritik der Urteilskraft, Kant saw the need to bridge the hiatus separating understanding
and sensibility by recurring to the concepts of reflection. 32 The concepts of reflection
are intermediary between immediate being (forms of intuition) and real phenomenal
existence (categorical schemata). From an empirical perspective, before representations
are related to one another under causal relations they must be compared to one another
in order to determine, e.g., whether they are part of the same identical thing or not. A
transcendental philosophy, therefore, must establish the a priori grounds of such
identity. In other words, a logic of reflection, of identity and difference, matter and
form, inner and outer, agreement and opposition, etc. must precede a logic of objective
existence. Hegel retains this order in Book II of the Logik. But there is a fundamental
difference between Hegel's and Kant's respective treatments of the concepts of reflection. Whereas Kant regards the role of transcendental reflection to be that of assigning
the concepts of reflection to heterogeneous transcendental domains, so that,
e.g., identity (Einerlei), is properly understood to be a function of the understanding
while difference (Verschiedenheit) is seen as given in sensibility, Hegel construes
reflection ontologically, as the dialectical movement of thought and reality in which the
understanding/intuition, identity/difference, form/matter distinctions are aufgehoben.
Again, in Hegel's opinion, Kant's treatment of reflection is reminiscent of the Enlightenment's preoccupation with faculty psychology. The terminus a quo of Hegel's
enterprise, on the contrary, is the metaphysical problem of being.

" Yvon Belaval, La doctrine de !'essence chez Hegel et chez Leibniz, in: Archives de Philosophie,
33, 1970, pp. 579-604, Kant-Studien, 63, 1972, pp. 436-462, and in Studi Internazionali di
Filosofia, 108, 1974, pp.115-138.
" Logik II, p. 15; Logic, p. 586.
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Let us now turn to Kant's critique of Leibniz. In the section of the Kritik der reinen
Vernunft entitled "Von der Amphibolie der Reflexionsbegriffe," Kant is concerned
with exposing a confusion to which dogmatic rationalism is prone, namely, the
assumption that pure analysis of what is thought in the concept of an object yields
informative, i.e., synthetic, knowledge of the object itself Uncritical rationalism seeks
to extend its knowledge of the real ground of phenomena by comparing them in
accordance with the concepts of reflection as the pure understanding conceives them.
Transcendental reflection, in contrast, distinguishes pure thought objects (noumena)
from sensible intuitions. Subsequently, it restricts the objective employment of such
concepts to the formal conditions of space and time. 33
By collapsing pure understanding and sensible intuition, Leibniz, Kant maintains
blurs the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements. This confusion lead~
him to disregard the importance of space and time as the a priori sensible ground of
synthetic knowledge in general - an error, Kant believes, which is profoundly evident
in Leibniz's amphibolic treatment of individuation. 34 Leibniz states that the ideality of
spatio-temporal relations derives from the fact that they are but confused, sensible
representations of rationally ordered states of substances, so that strictly speaking, the
identities of such substances are internally contained within their complete notions."
But in that case, the manner in which spatio-temporal phenomena are well-founded
remains enigmatic. There is no sufficient reason which explains how we get from
immutable, internally consistent essences to variable, conflict-ridden phenomena, from
conceptual unity to existential multiplicity, or from abstract logical identity to the
identity-in-difference of dynamic substances. 36 By wedding the idea of internal relations to the law of contradiction, Leibniz eliminates the category of interrelation
altogether; either a concept analytically contains another concept, in which case they
are unrelated, or it does not, in which case they are again unrelated. This reinforces the
suspicion that, for Leibniz, absolutely simple (partless), self-contained substances exist
prior to relations, or what is the same thing, that matter is prior to form, if what we

33

34
35

.,,,..
36

For a concise discussion of Kant's critique of the amphiboly of reflection see H.J. Paton, Kant
on the Errors of Leibniz, in: Kant Studies Today, ed. L. W. Beck, La Salle, 1970, pp. 72-87.
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Reclam, Stuttgart, 1966, A 270/B 331.
L. Couturat, ed., G. W. Leibniz: Opuscules et fragments inedits, Paris, 1903, p. 8. Leibniz did
not deny that spatio-temporal differences are sufficient for distinguishing things, but he
maintained that such phenomenal differences have their ground in internal essences. (See Letters
to Samuel Clarke, in: Leibniz Selections, ed. P.Wiener, New York, 1951, p.245). This is
basically Hegel's position as well. Moreover, Hide Ishiguro has shown (Leibniz's Theory of the
Ideality of Relations, in: Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays, ed. H. G. Frankfurt, Garden
City, N. Y., 1972) that for Leibniz the ideality of such relations did not entail their eliminative
reducibility to one-place predicates. On the contrary, he, like Hegel, affirmed just the opposite,
namely, that all predicates are ultimately relational in nature - a fact which generates a
contradiction between the monad's self-subsistence and its dependence upon external conditions.
Kr. d. r. V. A 273/B 329-A 275/B 331.
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rnean by matter and form respectively are substrate of potentiality and actual limitation
and negation."
To conclude, Leibniz's system of monads harbours a deep-seated contradiction
which is not satisfactorily mitigated by his appeal to divinely pre-established harmony.
The monad's identity is supposed to be internally related to the aggregate of monads,
but the conceptual reduction implicit in such an analytic relation would seem to entail
an invidious monism. If, however, grasping the other horn of the dilemma, we affirm
the absolute disjunction of an infinite plurality of monads, then we are left with
relationless, undifferentiated atoms.
Hegel concurs with Kant's assessment of the problem encountered by Leibniz's
reduction of real identity to abstract logical identity, and he too locates the source of
the difficulty in Leibniz's failure to appreciate the synthetic a priori ground of reality.
However, unlike Kant, who is inclined to bifurcate the ground into two separate
sources of knowledge, sensibility and understanding, Hegel elevates transcendental
apperception (metaphysically conceived as Geist) to the supreme, all-encompassing
ground of synthesis tout court. But if Hegel returns to Leibniz in abolishing the
distinction between sensibility and understanding and, in effect, reproaches Kant for
grounding real identity in spatio-temporal location, how does he circumvent the
Leibnizian aporia? He does so by conceiving reason dialectically. Stated differently, he
retrieves those concepts of reflection which Kant transfers from pure understanding to
the jenseits of sensibility, namely, difference, opposition, matter, etc., and extends their
range of application to include the very reason which grounds reality as such. Hegel can
afford to hold the doctrine of indiscernibles because in Book II of the Logik he liberates
the internal conceptual relations which rationally ground identity from the logical
constraints (P. 3) imposed upon them by Leibniz.
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III
The metaphysical problems associated with essence, ground, and sufficient reason
are rendered otiose within the Kantian system. The section on the amphibolies declares
that questions concerning the ultimate foundations of existence are meaningless. 38 The
principle of sufficient reason likewise loses its ontological import. Existence is given in
sensation and knowledge is limited to the discovery of causal regularities within its
purview. The ontological argument is accordingly denigrated - one cannot argue from
essence to existence.
It is otherwise with Hegel, who is not content with juxtaposing empirical categories.
His point of departure in the Logik is qualitative being, not sensible existence, and
therefore, he like Leibniz must demonstrate the logical necessity of existence from
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Kr. d. r. V. A 283/B 339-A 286/B 342.
Kr. d. r. V. A 278/B 334.
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being and essence - a metaphysical tour de force which culminates in the grand
apotheosis of absolute idealism."
In Leibniz, the transition from essence to phenomenal existence proceeds by a way
of a deus ex machina. God externally reflects upon an ensemble of essences denoting
prima possibilia, the combinations of which are subordinated to the laws of formal
logic. At this stage, individuation ostensibly manifests itself in the complete notion as
absolute positive limitation, which nonetheless subsists prior to reflection and negation.
Phenomenal existence, which is burdened with conflict and negation, ineffably supervenes in the complete notion as absolute positive limitation during the act of creation.
At this point Platonic eidos gives way to Aristotelian telos; the monadic entelechy
individuates itself to the degree that it realizes its essence and becomes self-determining,
and it becomes so the more it reflects, or concentrates, the concrete totality within
itself. 40
The transition from transcendence to immanence is presented by Leibniz as if it were
an inexplicable fait accompli. (Leibniz cannot rationally demonstrate the well-foundedness of phenomena because he conceives of essence as if it were a lifeless, geometrical
chain of possible deductions.) Later in the creation process, when the monad is
supposed to be self-determining, it is still a receptacle which passively reflects relations
that have been predetermined by God. These relations are integral to its identity in the
same way that reflections are integral to the differentiation of a mirror's surface, but the
mirror and the source of illumination, Hegel observes, condition one another externally, or mechanically. In itself, the monad, like the mirror, is an undifferentiated
thing, or bare particular, which remains indifferent to its properties." Thus, Leibniz's
metaphysics unintentionally succumbs to the objections which he levels against Newtonian mechanics. On the one hand, the only kind of sufficient explanation Leibniz can
countenance as legitimate are those that accord with his peculiar reading of identity,
which assimilates all phenomenal changes to essential ones. These explanations, which
are of the form 'Y happens to X (X is P) because it is of the nature of X for Y to happen
to it (P is the essenct; of X)' are empty tautologies. On the other hand, because the
monad's successive dynamic states are not, in fact, determined by it all, but only reflect
an external order, its identity is dissolved into a congeries of unrelated appearances, or
"bubbles." Such appearances have no unity other that those mechanical regularities
which the understanding adventitiously finds in them and these empirical generaliz-
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ations do not so much explain phenomena as tautologically record their persistence. 42
For Hegel, the key to overcoming the Leibnizian dilemma resides in showing that
essence is immanent in appearance. The defense of this assertion rests upon a demonstration that essence both is and is not its appearances - a contradiction which
admittedly is not readily accessible to analytic thought. Nonetheless, if we bear in mind
what Hegel is trying to avoid, then the contradiction loses some of its mystery. Simply
put, Hegel is trying to steer a middle course between the Scylla of skepticism and the
Charybdis of what Kant calls dogmatism - the affirmation of a transcendent ground of
identity existing apart from the way things appear. Skepticism maintains that appearances, or empirical descriptions of identity, are only subjective and stand in no relation
to the substratum to which they refer. A corollary to this kind of nominalism is the idea
that substances are "bare particulars" (Locke's je ne sais quoi) - a notion which runs
counter to our ordinary Aristotelian proclivities to regard individuation as a function of
internal qualification. Dogmatism no better succeeds in uniting ordo cognoscendi and
ordo essendi than does skepticism, but it reverses epistemological priorities by securing
the principle of individuation in rationally knowable essences; the epistemological
problem of ascending from appearances to essences is the reverse side of the ontological
problem of making sense of the notion of "bare particulars." The upshot of the
preceding analysis is that essence and appearance must be irreducible, yet somehow
internally related. In effect, Hegel, like Kant before him, will argue that identity, no
less than objectivity, must be grounded in the immanent relations of phenomena rather
than in transcendent essences. 43
The central arguments in Book II of the Logik which presently concern us are
contained in Chapters Two and Three of Section One. Hegel's initial contention is that
essential identity entails contradiction. In contrast to the abstract identity of formal
logic (A = A, 'A tree is a tree'), the actual identification of phenomena is a synthetic
activity which unites a manifold of diverse appearances under a distinct identity (this
tree as a unique growth process). 44 A tree is not any one of its developmental stages
42

43
39

40

41

Belavel notes (La doctrine de !'essence Archives de Philosophie, p. 558) that the difference
between Leibniz and Hegel on this score is that « ..• le monisme hegelian generalise a toute
existence I' argument ontologique ... tandis que, chez Leibniz, le existence d'un etre fini ne se
developpe pas d'elle-meme a partir de !'essence: Dieu l'y surajoute par un acte de creation.
(Cout. Op. 376)».
See G. W. Leibniz, On the Ultimate Origin of Things, in: Wiener, pp. 346--55, Discourse on
Metaphysics, esp. VIII, XIII, and XIV (loc. cit.), On Necessity and Contingency (loc. cit.,
pp. 480-85), and The Monadology, Nos. 43-60 (loc. cit.).
Logik II, pp. 181-82; Logic, p. 712.
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Contra empiricism, Hegel agrees with Leibniz that phenomena cannot be sufficiently explained
without appealing to some doctrine of essence. See D. Henrich, Hegels Logik der Reflexion, in:
Hegel im Kontext, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt, 1971, pp.95-156, for a detailed discussion of the
transition from Book I to Book II of the Logik concerning this issue. Also, see R. Pippin (n. 43
below) to whom I am indebted for much of the preceding and following formulation of the
problem.
Logik I, pp. 486--504; Logic, pp. 394--408. For a further elaboration of some of the aspects of the
identity problem treated here, see R. Pippin, Hegel on Contradiction, in: Journal of the History
of Philosophy, Vol. XVI, 3, 1978, pp. 301-312.
Logik I, pp. 508-515; Logic, pp. 411-418. Taken from the past participle gewesen, Wesen, Hegel
reminds us, literally means the abiding that has been. Note: A Fregian sense/reference
distinction could provide an optional analysis of identity at this point and Fulda (Unzuldngliche
Bemerkungen zur Dialektik) suggests that the distinction is helpful in trying to understand
some of the early transitions in the Logik. Nevertheless, the distinction cannot be vigorously
applied to the dialectic of Book II without reintroducing some version of the doctrine of bare
particulars which Hegel is trying to avoid.
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taken singly, but neither is it something other than the becoming of these "moments."
Understood from the standpoint of subject-predicate logic, the synthetic nature of
individuation forces us to concede that the subject and predicate of essential descriptions are related to one another under the opposed rubrics of difference (Unterschied)
and identity (Jdentitat). 45 A predicate essentially individuates a particular only by
making use of determinations that are not what that particular is, precisely in order to
say something informative about it in the first place. Thus, Socrates, for example, both

is and is not a man.
Is Hegel here guilty of conflating the 'is' of predication with the 'is' of identity as
Russell accuses him of doing, viz., is Hegel only making the trivial claim that a
particular (Socrates) is not identical to some universal (man), which is nevertheless truly
predicated of it? 46 The answer to this question depends on whether Socrates is a man
only in the Russellian sense that a particular denoted by the name 'Socrates' just
happens to be the existential placeholder of the predicate "snubnosed." If Socrates is a
man only in this attenuated, accidental sense, then we are again committed to some
version of the doctrine of bare particulars. The only alternative to this metaphysical
posture is a theory of essential definition in which the predicate is joined to the subject
by way of identity and difference, thereby generating a contradiction."
Anticipating his later discussion of contingency (Zufalligkeit), Hegel notes at the
conclusion of this chapter that finite things must recede into, or fall to, the ground
(zugrunde gehen), precisely because they consist of a multiplicity of contradictory
determinations." Hegel's pun is not gratuitous, for he, like Leibniz, must provide a
sufficient reason (Grund) for essential differentiation in general which will also explain
the world of phenomena (Wirklichkeit). The classical form/matter distinction figures
predominantly in Hegel's treatment of ground, which he characterizes (again, drawing
from the speculative ambiguity of the term) as an "absolute recoil (Gegenstofl) of
essence upon itself." Ground reflects upon itself as the dual subject/object of individuation. Qua identical substrate of change, ground is the passive matter of potentiality.
Qua rational movement wherein actual identity is determined, grounding is negative
activity (Tatigkeit, analogous to Aristotle's energeia) which internally informs immediate being and endows it with real existence. This Kantian conception of form as
synthetic activity presages the subjective logic, where pure apperception assumes the
metaphysical role of absolute ground. Within the context of the objective logic, Hegel
is primarily interested in reversing the Leibnizian primacy of matter over form. By
refuting the myth of the given, he demonstrates the untenability of the matter/form
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Logik I, pp.515-517 & 535; Logic, pp.417-418 & 431.
B. Russell, Logic as the Essence of Philosophy, in: Our Knowledge of the External World

(London, 1914).
See R. Aquila, Predication and Hegel's Metaphysics, in: Kant-Studien, 64, 1973, pp. 231-245 for
a more thorough examination of these issues.
Logik I, p. 541; Logic, p. 435.
Logik I, pp. 551-574; Logic, pp. 444-461. See Belaval (La doctrine de !'essence, Kant-Studien)
for further commentary on this chapter as it bears upon the Leibniz/Hegel connection.
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The full implication of Hegel's discussion of the matter/form distinction appears in
the final section of Book II entitled "Wirklichkeit." The previous examination of
ground, conceived dialectically as matter (potency) and form (actuality), suggests that a
thing's identity is a function of modality (the possible formal mutation it can endure
without becoming other than it is). At this juncture of the argument Hegel endeavors to
show that the contradiction which is endemic to essential identity must be elaborated as
a contradiction between contingency and rationally grounded Selbstandigkeit. Now the
gravamen of Hegel's repudiation of Leibnizian metaphysics is directed against the
principle that essence, understood as the matter of possibility, precedes actuality.
Logical possibility, which is sufficiently established by the absence of contradiction,
can be formulated as a disjunctive relationship of exclusive terms, A or not-A, each of
which is internally consistent. In Hegel's judgement, such a notion of possibility is
incoherent. Until the possibility of one of the exclusive disjuncts is denied, the other
disjunct must remain non-actual and a fortiori, impossible. But since mere logical
possibility favors the actuality of neither the one nor the other, both are necessarily
impossible. A more coherent notion of possibility, Hegel argues, is one which
incorporates the actual. 50
Contingency is the category that articulates the idea of an existent whose being is
merely possible. Possibility and actuality are complementary notions; the actual is fully
existent (self-subsistent and self-identical) only after its possibility has been deduced, or
grounded, and the possible (the essential ground) achieves greater potentiality in direct
proportion to its degree of actualization.
Now contingent being is burdened with the contradiction that, being merely
possible, the conditions of its existence are yet distinct from it. Once again, we
encounter the dialectic of infinity in which the price of finitude is endless dispersion.
Thus, Hegel's assertion that possible being is the verhaltnislose unbestimmte Behalter
fur alles uberhaupt applies to contingent actuality as well insofar as the latter is
attributed a ground (the condition of its possibility) which is itself comprised of an
indeterminate multiplicity of self-subsistent beings - a groundless ground."
The formal moments of contingency are developed more concretely in the categories
of real possibility, actuality and necessity. The real possibility of some thing or event is
the existing multiplicity of circumstances sufficient to bring it about. So construed, real
possibility contains within itself an indefinite aggregate of conditions which effects a
completion, or definite result. Once something has become really possible, it necessarily happens. The interface adjoining possibility, necessity, and actuality, therefore, is
the ephemeral moment linking an antecedent causal nexus to a unitary constellation of
effects. 52
50
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52

Logik I, 680-685; Logic, 542-546. Again I refer the reader to Belaval (La doctrine de /'essence,

Studi Internazionali di Filosofia) for a fuller treatment of Hegel and Leibniz on modality.
Logik I, pp. 681-683; Logic, pp. 543-546.
Logik I, p. 685; Logic, p. 547. The groundlessness of contingency as Hegel understands it is well
clarified by George D. Giovanni, The Category of Contingency in the Hegelian Logic, in: Art
and Logic in Hegel's Philosophy, Humanities Press, 1980.
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Hegel concludes his examination of modality by emphasizing that contingent being
is both its own raison d'etre - it is internally constitutive of the totality of conditions
which determine it and, as such, is self-determining - and yet groundless, because its
content absorbs an infinitely indeterminate impact.
Hegel's analysis of contingency is relevant to the question of individuation because
the content which constitutes a thing's identity only unfolds in the course of its
interaction with an environment, a process which Leibniz's system of monads cannot
comprehend. Insofar as they are truly self-related, finite things display their Selbstandigkeit and rational groundedness in the form of a well-defined identity. The richness
of variable content which accompanies their individuation is simply the intense
concreteness of the totality concentrated in an Archimedian point. Conversely, insofar
as finite things are dependent upon conditions which remain bound to an indefinite
horizon of possible interaction, individuation is contingent, or permanently ambiguous
and indeterminate. The scope of possible change is groundless because each successive
event actuates a further alteration in the contextual mise-en-scene, thereby generating
new possibilities of identity which continually frustrate any determinate closure. To be
is to possess an identity that is at once perduring and evanescent. Or, in the words of
Hegel, ,, ... das Seyn der endlichen Dinge als solche ist, den Keim des Vergehens als ihr
lnsichseyn zu haben, die Stunde ihrer Geburt ist die Stunde ihres Tades.""
To conclude, Hegel's treatment of identity in Book II of the Logik does not provide
any practical solution to problems concerning the actual identification of things. If
anything, it represents a significant contribution to current discussions concerning the
viability of essentialism and it may well represent a compromise between Scholastic and
Wittgensteinian approaches to this issue (Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblances
captures the indeterminacy of "essential" classification, but it altogether elides the
fundamental problem of Hegel's Logik concerning the Grundlage of determination).
Moreover, it is the first major attempt to explain identity in a way which accords with
our actual experience while yet satisfying the demands of reason for justification. On
the one hand, it shows that our commonsense intuitions about relations between
objects and their properties are probably inconsistent - we find the idea of "bare
particulars" unpalatable, if not incoherent, yet we persist in making an absolute
distinction between essential and accidental properties which is surely no less defensible. Rationalism, to be sure, avoids this inconsistency by reducing accide nts (appearances) to essences, but this gesture invariably proves futile, for the questio iuris concerning the possibility of real identity is left hanging in the air - unless, of course, we
follow Hegel in abandoning the law of contradiction.
In retrospect, Leibniz was not fully cognizant of the contradictions implicit in his
notion of the monad and generally tried to suppress them by sundering being into two
disparate regions, a world of immutable essences and a world of appearances. Hegel,
who follows his predecessor in affirming the primacy of reason, embraces the contra-
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diction as the most genuine expression of reality. Thus, it is not without irony that
what is reputed to be the ne plus ultra of all rationalist theodicies can only prove itself
worthy of the title by demonstrating the necessity of contingency. As a principal
beneficiary of the Hegelian legacy, existentialism, more than any other contemporary
philosophical movement, has seized upon this trenchant paradox as proof of the
absurdity of all rationalism. Ruminating over a bout of nausea endured while perceiving
the de trap root of a chestnut tree, Sartre's fictional hero Roquentin is inspired to sum
up the fragility of identity accordingly: « ••. la racine, les grilles du jardin, le bane, le
gazon rare de la pelouse, tout ca s'etait evanoui; la diversite des choses, leur individualite
n'etait qu'une appearance, un vernis.» 54
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Logik I, p. 178; Logic, p. 129.
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J.-P.Sartre, La Nausee, Gallimard, Paris, 1938, pp.179-80.

